POLITICAL ISLĀM OR POLITICAL MUSLIMS? –POWER, AUTHORITY AND THE STATE IN MODERN SŪDĀNESE HISTORY RECONSIDERED

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the concept of Political Islam particularly as it relates to pre-independence Sudanese history. It begins with a re-assessment of contemporary studies on this concept as a premise for its inquiry into the reasons which makes Islām susceptible to the schemes of "Political Muslims". It proceeds, thereafter, to examine the dynamics in the manifestation of "Political Islām" in the Turco-Egyptian, Mahdīst and British eras in Sūdān. It concludes with the argument that, in line with its pre-independence history, the future of Sūdān, as it is with the rest of the Muslim world, will likely be determined by the extent to which the gulf between Islām and the Muslims is mitigated.

Introduction

Sūdān is, and has always been, a Centre-point of crises and conflicts since the medieval up till the modern period. These crises and conflicts which, in the main, have centered around "hegemony/legitimacy, security, and revenue generation" (Young, 1994:35-40) have, however, found Islām as a counterfoil, a stabilizing factor against the autarkic forces in the area which have continually pushed the country towards disintegration and chaos. Islām emerged in Sūdānin 1504 as the only force that could maintain a balance between the disparate socio-economic agents in *al-Funj*otherwise known as *al-Sultanat al-Zarqā* (The Blue-meaning Black-Sultanate) (Shibikah, 1964:77). Islām, so it appears, has also been responsible for the birth in Sūdān, in the late nineteenth century, of political movements like that of the Mahdī whose aim is the appropriation of state power, nothing more, nothing less(Yahya, 1959:12). Islām had previously been pleaded by the Turco-Egyptian powers as the sole motive behind the annexation of DārFūrand other towns in the lower parts of the Nile Valley to its sphere of authority (Sabry, 1948:45). The quest by the Muslims and Islāmic movements and groups for State power in the early modern period in Sūdān could not, therefore, butbe a reflection and an extension of their pre- and early modern history.

By deploying Islām with great measure and gusto to the service of politics in the early modern period in Sūdān, the Muslims reinforced the argument for the existence of what is contemporaneously known as "Political Islām". Exactly what does this concept mean and to what extent is its employment by critics of Muslim state and politics in the contemporary period valid?

Politicalislām: A Critique

Viewed from a remote, the phrase "Political Islām" would refer to an aspect of Muslim's life the goal of which is the attainment of political authority. But the idea has become an overarching concept which has been invested with cultural politics. At one instance Political Islām would, according to John Esposito, refer to "Islāmic fundamentalism" or a "religious resurgence in private and public life and "an alternative to the perceived failure of secular ideologies such as nationalism, capitalism, and socialism"(Esposito, 2010:1-11). Political Islām becomes evident in Muslim life when "Islāmic symbols, rhetoric, actors, and organizationsbecome sources of legitimacy and mobilization, informing political and social activism"(Esposito, 2010) or when Muslim governments in such countries as Sūdān, Algeria, Saudi Arabia "appeal to Islām in order to enhance their legitimacy and to mobilize popular support for programs and policies"(Esposito, 2010).

John Esposito's reading of political Islām could be considered to be that of the outsider, the popular predilection of Western critic of Islām to impugn and disparage efforts by the Muslims to give practical effects to the normative precepts of the religion. Samir Amin's perspective, the insider's reading of political Islām is, however, compelling.

The paper titled "Political Islām" (Amin, 2001:3-6), attempts a   critique of political movements all around the Muslim world. He begins his discussion by refusing to privilege the designation of those movements which claim to be "one true Islāmic faith" as "Islāmic fundamentalism". Rather, he employs a phrase which, according to him, is "used in the Arab world: Political Islām". He says further: "we do not have religious movements, *per se*, here – the various groups are all quite close to one another – but something much more banal: political organizations whose aim is the conquest of state power, nothing more, nothing less. Wrapping such organizations in the flag of Islām is, simple straightforward opportunism"(Amin, 2001:4).

Amin's perspectives, however, problematic. It throws up the whole question of the origin and the true meaning of the phrase "Political Islam". In other words, by saying "I prefer the phrase used in the Arab world",Amin calls attention to the absence of consensus among critics on the genealogy of the phrase and the inherent problem/s in the identity and activity of subjects to which it refers. This is evidenced in the lack ofconcordance between his perspective and Esposito's with reference to how Muslims' participation in political activity may be designated.

But they appear to have a consensus on the necessity to refer to the latter pejoratively and to deplore same in the most negative adjectives possible. Amin says: "Political Islām is the adversary of liberation theology. Itadvocates submission not emancipation"(Amin, 2001:4).

Amin's perspective essays the need for the interrogation of the above claims. Inherent in the phrase "Political Islām" is a confusing conflation of Islām and Muslims. Scholars who are involved in the study of Islām and Muslim societies are often in the habit of "reducing everything to a given set of doctrines and attributing the practices and ideology of Islāmic movements to the implementation of these doctrines"(Najmabandi, 1991:63). Whereas Islām is, in Kenneth Craig's phrasing, "the Quranically revealed/guided religion"(Craig, 1971:9-24) Muslims are those who, either by conviction or lack of it, believe in and identify with Islām and attempt to put its tenets into practice. Whereas Islām has to do with faith/theology and, indeed, dogma, the Muslims' attempt to "migrate" with Islām from theory to praxis remains an open field of inquiry for social scientists. Whereas, for the Muslims, the fundamentals of the religion *(Usūl ad- dīn)* are immutable and are perpetually insulated against human foibles and inadequacies, the branches of the religion (*al-Furū′*) - the daily activities of the Muslims - are not only sources of debate and controversies but could also come in conflict with the basic tenets of the religion. Thus 'the recognition that "Islām" and "Muslims" are not synonyms" therefore, "is important because it helps in avoiding essentializing Islām and reifying it as anahistoric, unembodied ideal which is more-or-less imperfectly actualized in this or that community. It also refuses to privilege the dominant discourses of one particular Muslim community at one particular time over all others hence avoiding essentializing the histories of Muslim communities"(Shaheed, 1994:997-10).

The need to avoid the confusing conflation of Islām and Muslims and the tendency not to allow Islām to self-define becomes all the more pertinent if consideration is given to socio-cultural trends in northern Sūdān. Here, resultant of the seemingly all-encompassing influence of the religion, the world has consequently been led to yet one other negative conflation: Sūdānis Islām and Islām is Sūdān. Thus, certain Sūdānesecustoms which have survived across centuries like Female Genital Mutilation (FGM)(Imam, 2001:) is now seen by a section of the world as an Islāmicpractice. The heinous extension of the female genitalia for the male sexual pleasure in Sūdān has been situated, quite inappropriately, as a religious duty; a rewardable action not for the girl-child who experiences the agony and pains but the patriarchal authorities.

Further the deployment of the phrase "Political Islām" to mirror the trajectories in the Muslims' struggle for state power especially in the colonial period could be seen by the Islāmists as a refusal on the part of Scholars who are involved in the study of Islām and Muslims to treat Islām as a normative entity. Islām, in the Islāmists' viewpoint, is, and when properly understood, should be seen "as an end not a means to an end(Turabi, 1988:43)"Political Islām" as a rubric in the

study of Muslim societies might, therefore, be controverted since the phrase appears to exclude other aspects of Islāmic practices the totality of which constitutes the ethos of the religion. In other words, would the Muslims' participation in politics or their deployment of Islām to serve political ends create a variety of Islām that could be political the same way their involvement in economic, social or technological activities lead to critical inquiry into Economic, Social and Technological Islām?

In other words, why is it that "Economic Islām", "Social Islām" and "Agric Islām" have not become popular phrases such that they would occasion the same panoply of critical reviews the like of which the so-called "Political Islām" now enjoys? A response might be the recognition of the inherent powers of politics to superintend all aspects of human life. "Political Islām" could equally have become subject of these negative reviews as a manifestation of the continuing negative interface between Islāmic culture and civilization and that of the West and Western-oriented critics and scholars.

But when Samir says that "Political Islām is not interested in the religion which it invokes…"(Amin, 2001:5) he hits a critical issue of relevance to this paper. This has to do with the tendency on the part of Islāmic movements and activists to use Islām for their personal ends. Face to face with this proposition - a religio-cultural problematic in which Muslims deploy their identities for purposes which may run counter to the very spirit of Islām - the suggestion then becomes important: instead of talking about "Political Islām", we should rather talk about "Political Muslims" - Muslim politicians in Islāmic garbs. This is further evidenced, as shall be buttressed below, in our re-engagement with the Sūdānese political landscape during the early modern period. It is implicated in the "Political Muslims" preparedness to circumvent and re-map the margins of the otherwise revered remits of Islām on the altar of political expediencies. But just before we enter into that slippery landscape, one question remains pertinent: why is Islām a ready instrument for political ends in Arab-Islāmic history particularly that of the Sūdān?

Political Islām in Sūdān: The Origins

An initial response might be the universal impact of the religion on Sūdānese history, custom and way of life. Apart from playing a pivotal role in the establishment of authority and order in the area since 1504, Islām has also sought to reinvent the Sūdānese society and "transform it according to its blue print (Young, 1994:35-40). This is evidenced in, for example, the political structure in Sūdān since the medieval period. Before the beginning of modernity, a typical Sūdānese kingdom usually cut the picture of an Islāmic empire – of domes, minarets, and Arabic calligraphic designs(Najīllah, 1959:20;O'Fahey, 1980:30). Political power was situated, during this period, in the hands of the *Sultān,* the *Malik* and the *Amīrs*whose identity, paraphernalia of office are often

embellished, influenced by or infused with such Islāmictoga as the turban, *jalābiyyah*and the rosary(Holt and Daley, 1988). It became pertinent, therefore, that successive powers in Sūdān not only had to use Islām as a means of gaining state power and legitimacy among the populace but also in maintaining their authority. Thus, Political Islāmbecame an existential imperative. The deployment of Islām as a political weapon became, in Binagi's thesis(Binagi, 1984:15), a survival tactic-the only potent weapon with which power could be gained and lost in the area.

Apart from the usual Muslim rituals and daily observances over which the *Ulamā*have always presided, the SūdāneseIslām has, since the medieval period, been dominated by Sūfīsm (O'Fahey, 1973:49; Lapidus, 1988:490). The *Shuyūkh*in the *Khahvas,* whether they belonged, for example, to the *Majdhūbiyyah, Khatmiyyah* and the *Iddrīsiyyah*orders occupied probably the most important position in the Sūdānese society after the *Salātīn*(the Kings). Their area of influence usually includes the mundane and the spiritual. They are the custodians of the Sūdānese values, the sacred and the profane. They are also the owners and the distributors of *barakah* (O'Fahey, 1973:49). The *Shuyūkh*soon found themselves in a dilemma especially at the onset of colonial rule in Sūdān. They became torn between Islāmicethical principles which frown at their participation in political power and the need to maintain their spiritual stronghold over the Sūdānese. Invariably they opted for a synergy of the two extremes since, they probably would have conjectured, the spheres of religion and that of politics are too nebulous to be demarcated. In effect, the attainment of political power became a standard measurement with which the spiritual relevance of the *Shuyūkh* in the life of the Sūdānese could be determined. Sūfīsmultimately became part of political Islām in Sūdān and it remained so until the end of the colonial experience.

The Islāmic political precepts especially certain aspects of the Islāmic law which sublimates political power to a divine imperative might also be responsible for the ease with which Islām became amenable to political ends in the hands of the Sūdānese in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Having as its basis such religio-political works as al-Mawardī's*al-Ahkām al-Sultāniyyah*and Ibn Taimiyyah's*al-Siyāsah al-Shar'iyyah*in which an ideal State is seen as that over which a Muslim presides,(al-Mawardi, 1973:137) political Muslims in the early modern period in Sūdān would have, therefore, worked on the notion that political power belonged to them, not to the "Other"(Esack, 1999:51-76). WinsfredCantwill says that each time authority slips away from the control of the Muslims it always feels as "if sovereignty is … not only lost or the body-politic put in chain, but rather as one in which history has gone wrong and the government of the universe has been upset"(Smith, 1957:45).

The necessity for Muslims to deploy Islām as a weapon in the quest for political power could equally have been reinforced by the British authorities' strategy of devaluing the socio-cultural heritage and values of the Sūdānese. In other words, the British and other European powers

emerged in African and Asian territories during the late 19th and early 20th centuries on the assumption that their culture, the secular and the religious, is superior to those of the former. They hinged their despoliation and forceful annexation of the Muslim world on the claim that before their advent into Muslim world, the latter's history was, in line with Frantz Fanon one of "barbaric ...and that colonialism came to lighten their darkness"(Fanon, 1980:166-190); that Islām is the fundamental reason the Muslim world came under colonial administration; that Christianity came to set them free.

In their attempt to "revalue" their destroyed histories particularly that in which Islām occupies a central position and through this regain political power which they had conceded to the British, political movements in the Sūdān and in the Muslim world during the early modern period era found in Islām a veritable weapon for transaction in counter-hegemonic discourse. Islamic history equally provided them with the necessary arguments with which the colonial authorities could be confronted. The ʿUlamā began to argue that the reason the Muslims came under foreign subjugation inhered not in Islām but in the Muslims' failure to rise up to the dictates of their religion. Consequently, Political Muslimsemerged. They succeeded in hiding their individual desire for political power behind the mask of Islām and the espoused necessity to defend the Muslims' communal history. In the estimation of the masses, they were the real defenders of the religion. In fact, the future of the religion and the *Ummah* became circumscribed by the extent to which they achieved success in their quest for state power.

Political Islām in Turco-Egyptian and Mahdīst Eras in Sūdān

The above analyses are highly germane to political events during the Turco-Egyptian and the Mahdīst eras in Sūdān during the early and late 19th century. Muhammad ʿAlī's agents, ably assisted by Egyptian clerics including Shaykh Ahmad al-Salāwī al-Maghribī and Muhammad al-Asyūtī and courtesy of the conscious and constructive collaboration of the ʿUlamā and the Sūfī orders like the *Majdhūbiyyah* and the *Khatmiyyah* did all they could to convince the Sūdānese that the Turco-Egyptian rule in Sūdān had been approved by the Khalīfah al-Mumīnin Istanbul. Any opposition to the Turkish hegemony consequently became an act of apostasy, a heinous crime in Islāmic law (Rafah, 1927:27).

The strategy of making use of Islām as a political tool eventually proved highly effective. It guaranteed over six decades of Turco-Egyptian sovereignty over Sūdānduring which time the imperial and economic agenda of Muhammad ʿAlī and his successors received a great boost. It also sowed the seed of "Sūfī politics", or "Political Sūfīsm" in Sūdān in which the *Majdhūbiyyah, Khatmiyyah*and others played active roles, despite the supposedly a-political posturing of the *Shuyūkh*(al-Shaykh, 1983:135).

The Mahdīst movement in Sūdān in the late 19th century could, however, be referred to as the quintessential Political Islām. This is because not all Sūdānese approved the emergence of Muhammad Ahmad ʿAbdullah as the Mahdī(Shuqayr, 1967:). The Sūdānese patrons of the Turco-Egyptian powers particularly the Azhar-trained *Ulamā*and the *Shuyūkh*who belonged to the MirghānīSūfī order could not have approved of his authority just because he was, in part, responsible for putting an end to the Turco-Egyptian hegemony in the country(Martins, 1976). Historians would even argue that the Mahdī, Muhammad Ahmad ʿAbdullah was excoriated over his claim to the messianic figure. This is because he emerged as a contemporary to other Mahdīst elements including al-Hajj ʿUmar of Futa Toro in Senegal, ʿUthmān b. Fūdī in Northern Nigeria, ʿAmirʿAbd al-Qādirin Algeria, ʿUways al-Barāwī of Zanzibar and Shah Ma al-Aynayn of Mauritania(Shuqayr, 1967). The question then, as it is today, was who amongst these lot was the authentic Mahdī since the religious script which provides for the emergence of the messianic figure did not envisage such a motley of messianic claimants all at the same time?

The Mahdī of Sūdān could not offer a convincing response, at least, in action to the above. His style of administration and his un-preparedness to accommodate dissenting voices from amongst the leadership of the *tarīqah* whose assistance were strategic to his success greatly detracted from his popularity. It was not long before a deep gulf emerged between him and the critical mass of the Sūdānese populace. In order to guarantee complete and an unalloyed legitimacy from the masses, he took punitive actions against the Sūfī orders. Al-Manna Ismāʿil was executed not for any other reason other than on the allegation that he constituted a threat to the political visionof the Mahdī Esposito, 2010). Having suppressed all oppositions, the Mahdī became a synonym for Islām in the lower part of the Nile Valley. He became a law giver. His authority became an end in itself.

Thus, political Islām, during the Mahdīst era of Sūdānese history consisted not so much in the deployment of Islām to gain state power but, in our estimation, the undue and, in the words of John Esposito, "illegitimate use of religion (Esposito, 2010) or appropriation of Islām and the Islāmic underbellies of the Sūdānese societies to maintain political authority. Political Islām during this era witnessed total disregard for the Islāmic law. The Mahdīdenied unto himself and the Sūdānese, the existence of Islāmic legal scripts which could limit or inhibit the realization of its avowed political goal. Or how else can we, for example, explain the Mahdīst appropriation of the four Schools of Islāmic law such that Muhammad Ahmad ʿAbdullah became the only school of thought that the Sūdānese had to patronize? Could there be a justification for the ban imposed by the Mahdī and his successors on pilgrimage to Makkah- a fundamental feature of Islāmic faith-other than a practical manifestation of Political Islām?

Political Islām in British-Sūdān

Under the British hegemony in Sūdān, Political Islām became a *ḍarūrah*-a necessity - both for the colonists and the natives. It became the only weapon by which, as had been its experience in India, the British powers could achieve its imperial objectives. The British began by dividing the religious spectrum into two: "Popular Islām" and "Orthodox Muhammadanism"(Barakat, 1970). Even though the two represented variants of Political Islām in Sūdān, the British engagement and relations with them was, however, eclectic. "Popular Islām", in the British reckoning, belonged to *the faqīh*(the Jurists) and the heads of the Sūfī*ṭarīqah.* The Islāmof the Sūfī belonged to the Mahdīst elements; it represents a version of Islām that the British would ignore to its own peril. Nothing less than seven of such Mahdīst movements including that of Khalīfah Muhammad Sharīf and ʿAlīʿAbdulKarīm(O'Fahey, 1973:49), were witnessed within the first decade of the British take-over of Sūdān. Their incessant emergence is instructive of how useful a strategyMahdīsm proved to be in the hands of political Muslims in Sūdān in the early modern period. But unlike the Mahdī's experience, however, none of the new appropriators of the messianic personage had the military or political space to withstand the might of the British. They were crushed "mercilessly at their inception"[40].

Thus "Orthodox Muhammadanism"(Max and Engel, 1965) invariably became the preferred variant of Islām in British-Sūdān. The British authorities began to patronize and sponsor Islāmicinstitutions in the country. It established and funded the Board of ʿUlamā. It also built public *Kuttāb*(Schools) and Mosques in place of those that were privately owned. The establishment of public Mosques and *Kuttāb*- except perhaps when they belonged to the friends of the British-consequently became an imperative in order that the British authorities may be able to, using Marx and Engel's style(Shibikah, 1919, Warburg, 1971), control the Sūdānese"intellectual force" and thus serve as a counterfoil against nationalist trends in the country.

Perhaps more importantly, the British resuscitated pilgrimage to Makkah and Madīnāh which the Mahdī rulers had banned during their tenure. The abolition of the Hajj had, more than any other thing, occasioned the discontents and the disapproval of most Sūdānese and that of the Fallāta pilgrims from West Africa who previously had to traverse Sūdānon their way to the holy land(Yamba, 1995). The British authorities not only built quarantine stations for the pilgrims in Suakin but also placed them under the authorities of the *Shuyūkh*. It also helped the Sūdānese in defraying the expenses of maintaining the pilgrims and the stations. The British did all these not because there had been a change in official hatred and aversion for Islām. In other words, it is inconceivable to suggest that the British were genuinely interested in the promotion of Islāmic ideals. Rather their patronage of the Hajj rites was meant to increase its popularity among the Sūdānese who, in the British officers' view, would "not care who controls the state so long as the population knows that their religious interest are being protected"(Gramsci, 1971).

In controlling the state, however, and in order to attain complete hegemony, in the Gramscian sense(Bourdieu, 1977), over the lives of the Sūdānese the British, very early in the day, realized the need to control the Sūdānese ideologically. Put differently, the political expediency of a merger in British-Sūdān between ideological and physical control of the Sūdānese became a categorical imperative such that it became difficult, as it is in the contemporary period, to distinguish between the two(Scott, 1995). Ideological control of the colony "makes governance more efficient and less dependent on coercion. It facilitates greater fiscal control and makes extraction of resources easier"(Midgal,1997). It also gives the natives a false sense of belonging. They feel they also "have a stake in the well-being of the state" (colony) (Warburg, 1971).

The British had little difficulties in identifying individuals among the religious leaders in Sūdān who would assist in this direction. Sayyid Alī al-Mirghānī, Sayyid ʿAbdulRahmānal-Mahdī and Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Hindī among others(Warburg,1971) soon emerged as the "centripetal antidote to the centrifugal forces"(Fanon, 1980) that might threaten the colony. In these individuals, the British found an irresistible combination of spiritual excellence with political eminence. Their usefulness for the colonial enterprise and their preparedness to partake in Political Islām had become indubitable.

Thus "SūdāneseIslām", under the British, became an imperial tool. The religion was deprived of discourses which could have enriched the Sūdānese intellectual horizon and highlighted the evils of colonial rule. It was delimited to the daily rituals and annual pilgrimage to Makkah. It became a routine; a dead organism which is utterly incapable of kindling profound changes in the communal lives of its adherents. But why did the SūdāneseUlamā, Shuyūkhand leaders of the tarīqasbecame Political Muslims despite its heinous implications on Islām?

Prior to the arrival of the British to Sūdān, the area, in Fanon's mode, was a hungry land; the Sūdānese were starved of "bread, of meat, of shoes, of coal, of light. It is a town (country) on its knees"(Amin, 2001). The arrival of the British could have, therefore, meant, in the reckoning of the religious leaders, the arrival of "bread and butter". Closeness to the "British" became a "visa" to the choice portions of the fertile land which had become that of the colonists by virtue of its conquest. Cooperation with the British thus became an existential imperative. Thus, the Sayyids had no option but to engage the British powers in the game it knew best: "comprador capitalism"(Amin, 2001). While the British powers controlled the political space the Sayyids were happy to control the religious arena not in the name of the divine anymore but in the name of her Majesty, the Queen of England. In her name they became landowners among the mass of ordinary Sūdānese who toiled night and day in order to be relieved of the cruelty and austerity of their Sūdān. Sūdān ultimately became a booty not only for the colonists but also for the Sūdānese

religious leaders who plundered and appropriated the Sūdānese national wealth without compunctions.

But the above could actually have been peripheral. Reference to the Sayyids as Political Muslims under the British hegemony in Sūdān might actually have been a function of their desire to succeed the British powers. In other words, the Sayyids must have imagined themselves as heirs to the colonists. Face to face with nationalist movements in the early and mid-twentieth century in Sūdān which pointed to a direction other than that which they desired or envisioned, however, they started campaigning for an extension in the British mandate in the country. The fortune of the Sūdānese political landscape consequently inhered, they contended, not in nationalist movement and campaigns but in whatever plans the British had for the country(Amin, 2001). Thus, instead of calling for freedom, these leaders sought religious decrees that would perpetuate the colonial enterprise. Political Islām, using these personages as case studies became the anti-thesis of, in Samir's words "liberation theology". It calls for submission to colonial rule "not emancipation".

Conclusion

Hardly is there a concept in the contemporary period which generates much passion and discussions other than Islam. Attempts by scholars, both Muslims and non-Muslims alike, to derive meaning from the religion and its adherents' manifestation of same often lead to conflation and occlusion of the normative precepts of the religion in contradistinction to the fissures and fractures in Muslims' practices. Such a conflation is evident in the phrase "Political Islam". Even though this paper has suggested the employment of "Political Muslims" to mirror the inherent contours and dynamics in the Muslims' quest for state power in Sūdān since the beginning of the modem period it is instructive to note that the popularity of the phrase "Political Islam" as a tool of analyses is owed to the disconnect between Islām and the Muslims not only in Sūdān but across the contemporary Muslim world. Political Islām, or rather the activities of "Political Muslims" in Sūdānin the early modern period led to the negative image which Islāmsuffered even as it ensured the pauperization of the mass of the Sūdānese populace. Even though it ensured the material comfort of the Political Muslims under the British rule in the country, 'Political Islam'equally functioned in promoting colonial rule and the emasculation of nationalist movements in the country.An objective consideration of contemporary socio-political and economic challenges facing Sūdān essays similar trajectories. Thus, one could say that Political Islam will likely continue to play a major role in the fortune and, indeed misfortune, of the country the same way it played a significant role in the pre- and early eras of Sūdānese history.

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