“GLOBAL SECURITY STRATEGY: THE CASE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION”

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ABSTRACT

The European Union has become aware of the need for a common foreign and strategic policy due to the current threats facing it which are likely to undermine European peace (as stressed in the first Part of the 2003 Strategic Document). The need for a military policy has also been recognized. Therefore, the European States have realized gradually become aware of the need to establish close cooperation between the Member States by the development and implementation of a common foreign security and defense policy. From 2001 to the present day the threats have grown and become more complex due to technological innovations that have created more dangerous and powerful tools.

This research analyzes the New Global Strategy of the European Union drafted by the High Representative Federica Mogherini and published on June 28, 2016 and compares it with the previous strategic documents issued by the European Union from 2003 to 2008.

The impact of these strategic documents on the EU evolutionary process of developing a Global Security Policy is analyzed from two viewpoints. A thorough historical analysis re-establishes the factors that led to the birth of the European Union and the still-developing European Global Policy. Then written discourse analysis is implemented to examine the evolution of the various documents leading up to the New Global Strategy. The conclusion that the European foreign, security and defense policy has for some time been a very delicate point for the European Union emerges. This security and defense policy has developed over time, but it still needs revision and upgrading.

The EU is still in a development phase. Despite the pressure of terrorism and other global security issues, it lags behind in being able to deal with these challenges. The European Union needs to develop a comprehensive security policy. Since the launch of the EUGS the EU Global Strategy has proven to be the right way to guide the Union’s action and sustain its ambition to be a credible power and a reliable partner. The EUGS has demonstrated that a global policy
implemented throughout all of the Member States is the only solution to ensure peace and security for all citizens.

The EU needs to review the structural blocks that may be preventing the development and implementation of a coherent global security policy. Europe, the ‘Old World’ has always been slow to wake up to drastic changes and this lack of coherence and timely action is an example.

**Keywords:** European Union Global Strategy (EUGS), strategies documents, global security, European migration policy, written discourse/textual analysis

### 1. BACKGROUND

The European Community is at a crossroads. It currently faces ongoing threats to security due to ongoing trends of terrorism and immigration. Now more than ever the European Community needs a uniform security policy because no single member is able to implement one on its own. This work analyses the gradual development of European security programs and demonstrates the need for the development of a uniform strategy. The first section analyses the gradual process of defining a common security policy from a historical point of view.

The European Union has become aware of the need for a common foreign and strategic policy due to the current threats facing it which are likely to undermine European peace (as stressed in the first Part of the 2003 Strategic Document). The need for a military policy has also been recognized. Therefore, the European States have realized that the solution to counteract the threats is to establish close cooperation between the Member States by the development and implementation of a common foreign security and defense policy. From 2001 to the present day the threats have grown and become more complex due to technological innovations that have created more dangerous and powerful tools and political/social phenomena that threaten the European way of life. The following historical analysis is presented as a background for understanding the complex workings of the European Union in regards to the formulation of a coherent security policy.

#### 1.1 The European Defence Community

The European Union is often described as a civil or legislative power (Telò 2006; Pirozzi 2015; Smith 2005). This means that it exerts its influence in various areas such as trade and the economy, but the EU is not prominent in the traditional foreign policy and defense sector. The delay in the development of the foreign policy and security area is mainly due to the minimal resources that have been made available as well as the many obstacles that the EU has faced. The UK and France created a union known as the Treaty of Dunkirk, in 1947. It was a Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance against possible German military aggression. In 1948, this
accord was transformed into the new military agreement known as the Treaty of Brussels, which included the Benelux countries\(^1\). In 1949 twelve European countries, including the UK, France and the Benelux countries were added to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization\(^2\) as an intergovernmental military alliance, that differed from the Brussels Treaty because it included a military alliance\(^3\). Then French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed an alliance whereby Franco-German coal and steel production would be placed under a common High Authority within an organization where other European countries could participate. France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands accepted the challenge. Another treaty was created by French Prime Minister René Pleven where it was decided that Germany’s disarmament should be carried out by a supra-national European Army to avoid the risk of Germany developing the capability to wage another war. The European Defence Community\(^4\) was developed from the Pleven Plan, but the fear that an independent German Army or General Staff with the potential to return to power caused discordance between the countries. Four years later, the German rearmament question was still at the center of international debates and was influencing the European political, diplomatic and military landscape, producing tremendous pressure and disunity within the ranks of the Atlantic Alliance. In 1954, German rearmament was threatening the future of Europe and the NATO Alliance. On 30 August 1954, the French National Assembly in Paris voted against French participation in the European Defence Community, and the EDC collapsed. This generated a crisis because monitoring the Federal Republic of Germany would not be possible if it simply joined NATO. Five weeks later it ended when the British proposal was accepted at a special conference in London. British Foreign Minister Eden suggested that Italy and Germany join the Western European Union, and this was confirmed with the Modified Brussels Treaty\(^5\).

### 1.2 Rebirth of the Common Foreign Security Policy

A few years after the failure of the EDC, at The Hague Summit of 1969, Europeans countries tried to re-launch a plan of foreign policy and common security through the plan of European Political Cooperation\(^6\). The EPC gave authority to foreign ministers and heads of government to

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1. The Benelux Union is a politico-economic union between: Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.
2. NATO.
4. EDC.
5. Referred to as the Brussels Pact, was the founding treaty of the Western Union (WU) between 1948 and 1954, at which it point it was amended as the Modified Brussels Treaty (MTB) and served as the founding treaty of the Western European Union (WEU) until its termination in 2010.
6. The European Political Cooperation (EPC), was created in 1970 and formalised in 1987 with The Single European Act (SEA). It was the synonym for European Union foreign policy coordination until it was transformed in the Common Foreign and Security Policy with Maastricht Treaty.
debate about political and security tasks outside the legal structure of treaties. In 1981, the government strengthened the structure. After that Europe started a sort of military operation but these interventions were only on an experimental basis. It must be recalled that the EU started the development of security policies only in the early 90’s when foreign and security policy was put at the top of the agenda. This happened due to the end of the Cold War. In fact, with the fall of the Berlin Wall new opportunities at the international level opened up [Morelli, 2011]. European leaders were free to begin admitting recently independent states that were previously under Russian domination. Also, due to the many changes in the balance of political power a move towards a more global dimension began. Europe began a process of transformation into a global world. The collapse of the Soviet Union also led to the reunification of Germany, which called for a strengthening and reform of foreign and security policy. This was due to the Gulf War⁷, which highlighted the weaknesses of the European Union in this field and the inadequacy of the EPC structure. In June, 1990, European leaders started to discuss the necessity of an institutional reform. In 1991 when the fragility inherent in foreign policy was further highlighted with the problems in the Balkans, it was shown that the European Union had only a marginal role in the foreign and security policy field at the international level. The dependence of the EU on U.S. military assistance through NATO became clear. The Kosovo situation demonstrated the need of the EU to find a way to independently employ their means of security. The EU leaders realized that the problem of EU weakness in the field of foreign policy could no longer be postponed. Hence the Maastricht Treaty was created in December of 1991. The Maastricht Treaty transformed the EPC into the Common Foreign and Security Policy⁸. The Treaty created a new organization which was based on three pillars. The CFSP was set up within the second pillar, which intended to reform decision-making procedures and policies of foreign cooperation. Foreign policy became an ordinary part of Council business: EPC meetings of foreign ministers were incorporated in the General Affairs Council; the Political Committee developed into the Committee of Permanent Representatives⁹ and the EPC secretariat became involved in the Council secretariat. The Commission therefore created a new External Political Affairs Committee. The European Parliament did not have a part in CFSP decision-making. The USA favored a European Defence Policy independent of NATO. Hix and Hoyland [2011], stated that the WEU was an important element in the creation of the EU and helped to define defense and foreign policy issues for the European Council. They pointed out that the treaty intended to ‘strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic alliance’ and that “reform of CFSP should be a central issue for the 1996-7 IGC”. The consequence was the Amsterdam Treaty which included many innovations as well as the introduction of the Common Strategies. This was a new policy

⁸ CFSP.
⁹ COREPER.
that set up a common strategy under the guidance of the European Council. It set up specific objectives, duration, and means, to be activated by the EU and the member states. The aim was to present an explicit focal point of the EU foreign policy. According to Nugent [2008], the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam brought a great innovation to the field of foreign and security policy. Another addition was added with the incorporation in the TEU13, on June 1992, of the Petersberg task, a list of military priorities of crisis management, peace-keeping and humanitarian action. In addition to this, another big step towards security policy was taken with the establishment of a High Representative of the CFSP and the establishment of policy planning and early warning unit. After the Franco-British summit in Saint-Malo in 1998, EU leaders decided to start building a strong common foreign and security policy. This was due to the fact that the United Kingdom had abandoned the veto that it had held against the foreign policy of European common security. The Saint-Malo was followed by other important summits: the summit in Cologne in June 1999, where a willingness to continue to consolidate the common foreign and security policy was expressed, without prejudice or going against NATO. Also, after the UK decided to remove the veto on matters concerning security and defense decided in Cologne, the Council stated that it was necessary to have autonomous decision-making competences on crisis management issues and the security and defense issues that had been defined in the previous treaties. After the Cologne Summit in December 1999 there was the Helsinki Summit. The resolutions and contents of the Declaration of Cologne were consolidated and the Headline Goal of Helsinki was created. The Headline Goal was a project through which a European reaction force was to be created by 2003. It was to be made up of 60,000 men able to cope with all the tasks contained in the tasks of Petersberg and able to take action within 60 days. The primary goal of the 1999 Helsinki Summit was discussed again by the Member States in May 2004 and it was decided to set a new primary goal to be achieved by 2010, which provided for the creation of battle groups with more flexibility ready to be deployed in about 2 weeks and made up of about 1,500 men from three or four Member States which had to have prior approval by the UN before starting their intervention. In 2007, there were 18 operational units with full

11 The Petersberg tasks are a list of military and security priorities incorporated within the European Security and Defence Policy of the European Union (renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) per the Treaty of Lisbon).
12 Please note that the battle groups are the European Union military force but they do not represent the European army because a European army is not expected to be formed at the moment.

For more information see:
capacity [Hix & Høyland, 2011]. New changes were made with the Lisbon Treaty and now especially with the New Global Strategy of June 2016, the goal to further improve these forces and create greater collaboration between member states has been stressed, especially in the mission planning phases. As a side observation, a problem with the Battle Groups will be created by Brexit because the United Kingdom (along with France) was the biggest military force and this should create a problem of weak defense and security for the EU. Another step after Helsinki was the Feira Summit of 2000 where a non-military Headline Goal was constructed. The Treaty of Nice was signed in 2001 which entered into force in 2003. This resulted in the creation of the first Common European Global Strategy at the summit of Brussels. The proposal that was adopted was called “A Secure Europe in a Better World”. In 2004, a team study on Europe’s security capabilities introduced the Human Security Doctrine\(^\text{13}\) [Glasius and Kaldor, 2006] for Europe. In 2006, the study group brought a human security plan to the EU’s agenda. Therefore, in 2007 the Madrid Report purpose the codification of the “European Way of Security” and approved human security as a frame for EU external action [Pirozzi, 2013].

1.3 The Lisbon Treaty: Development and Results

It is often thought that the European foreign and security policy begins in experimental form in the early 1990’s. From that point, rapid development began into the early 2000’s especially after the Strategy of 2003, where foreign and security policy occupied a more central role [Menon, 2011]. Based on the success of earlier Treaties both from an economic point of view but also in other fields, including the common foreign and security policy, the EU leaders decided in 2004 to make a new treaty in Rome which was to establish a European Constitution and bring political and institutional reforms. But unfortunately, this treaty was not successful and was only ratified by 18 Member States and thus failed. The European Union had to face this failure and seek a solution. After fruitless efforts to prepare a new treaty the most problematic points of the Constitutional Treaty of 2004 were given up so it was that on 13 December 2007, European leaders signed the Lisbon Treaty which entered into force in 2009\(^\text{14}\), bringing many changes. The Lisbon Treaty has the elements of the Constitution Treaty but also demonstrates new diversity. The Lisbon Treaty has some elements in common with the Constitutional Treaty, but it took away the constitutional elements. Regarding the elements of continuity, it is often thought that the Lisbon Treaty of Rome brought major reforms at the institutional level. An effect was the

\(\text{13}\) Human Security is a doctrine. The term Human Security was introduced for the first time in 1994 by the UNP Human Development Report. It is not easy to define the term “Human Security”. It can be said that Human Security is a general goal of protection and defense from a threat.

\(\text{14}\) The Treaty of Lisbon came into force in 2009, and just like the previous treaty of Rome, the new Lisbon Treaty was likely to fail because it was initially rejected in Ireland but after several negotiations it was approved. For more information about the Treaty of Lisbon see: [Ashiagbor, D., Countouris, N., Lianos, J., 2012; Biscop 2008; Menon 2011; Morelli 2011; Nugent 2008; Piris 2010; Pirozzi 2015].
abolition of the three pillars introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, to make procedures much simpler and the introduce major elements, in the CFSP, the CSDP\textsuperscript{15} or ESDP\textsuperscript{16}. Other important changes were made to the voting mechanisms and guarantees of the institutional bodies. Also, it brought reform concerning economic governance mainly due to the global crisis of 2007-2008. It introduced the ability to leave the European Union through Article 50 of the TEU\textsuperscript{17}. The Lisbon Treaty has led to major reforms and changes in the structure of the European Union and its various fields of interest of EU. One of the greatest innovations of the Treaty of Lisbon was the improvement of foreign policy and common security immediately after the reforms [Strozzi, Mastroianni, 2016]. The innovations of foreign and security common policy brought with the Treaty that established the institutional charge of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy are as follows\textsuperscript{18}.

1. “The European Council, acting by a qualified majority, with the agreement of the President of the Commission, shall appoint the High Representative the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The European Council may end his term of office by the same procedure.

2. The High Representative shall conduct the Union's common foreign and security policy. He shall contribute by his proposals to the development of that policy, which he shall carry out as mandated by the Council. The same shall apply to the common security and defence policy.

3. The High Representative shall preside over the Foreign Affairs Council.

4. The High Representative shall be one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission. He shall ensure the consistency of the Union's external action. He shall be responsible within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union's external action. In exercising these responsibilities within the Commission, and only for these responsibilities, the High Representative shall be bound by Commission procedures to the extent that this is consistent with paragraphs 2 and 3” (Article 18 TEU)

Parliament became more participative with the Lisbon Treaty in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy, as follows:

\textsuperscript{15} The Common Security and Defence Policy.
\textsuperscript{16} European Security and Defence Policy.
\textsuperscript{17} Recently invoked for the first time on 29 of March 2017 by the United Kingdom to launch Brexit.
\textsuperscript{18} http://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12012M/TXT&from=EN.
• “The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall regularly consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy and inform it of how those policies evolve. He shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration. Special representatives may be involved in briefing the European Parliament. The European Parliament may address questions or make recommendations to the Council or the High Representative. Twice a year it shall hold a debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy, including the common security and defence policy.”

Another change that the Treaty of Lisbon brought about involved the Council presidency. It established the permanent office for the High Representative, concerning the configuration of the General Affairs Council according to Article 16, part 6, TEU as follows:

• “The Council shall meet in different configurations, the list of which shall be adopted in accordance with Article 236 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The General Affairs Council shall ensure consistency in the work of the different Council configurations. It shall prepare and ensure the follow-up to meetings of the European Council, in liaison with the President of the European Council and the Commission. The Foreign Affairs Council shall elaborate the Union’s external action on the basis of strategic guidelines laid down by the European Council and ensure that the Union’s action is consistent” (according to Article 36 TEU).

With the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council became an institution and it took a central role concerning the field of Common Foreign and Security policy. The European Council and the High Representative work together concerning the tasks of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The High Representative participates as an observer at the meetings of the European Council. The Commission was another institution which underwent a change concerning common foreign and security policy - Article 17, TEU defines the selection and operation of the Commission. The Commission promotes the general interest of the Union by ensuring the application of the Treaties and their supporting measures. It oversees the application of EU law, executes the budget and manages programs with all management functions. External representation is ensured except for common foreign and security policy and other Treaty cases. Commission members are chosen from Member States based on their general competence; the Commission is totally independent. The President defines work guidelines and appoints Vice Presidents (except The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and generally organizes and maintains activities of the Commission. The Commission is responsible to the European Parliament. Another creation of the Treaty of Lisbon was the agency with a central role in the field
of CFSP represented by the European External Action Service\(^{19}\), formally launched on 1 December 2010. EEAS is the European Union diplomatic service which helped the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy develop the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. The structure of the EEAS is composed of a central administration formed by the High Representative, an Executive Secretary General\(^{20}\), a Director-General for Administration\(^{21}\), a Deputy Secretary General and Political Directory\(^{22}\) and a Deputy Secretary-General for Inter-Institutional Affairs\(^{23}\). In addition, the Lisbon crisis management structures that have been integrated into the EEAS are: the Military Committee, the Operation Center (when activated) for the conduct of EU military missions, military staff, crisis management and planning, civil planning and conduct capacity and the Intelligence Center\(^{24}\). Also recently, the Division for Security Policy and Conflict Prevention has joined the EEAS. Another important result of the Lisbon Treaty was the introduction of Article 141, which was imported from the Commission and transformed into European Delegations managed by the EEAS. Before the Lisbon Treaty, delegations played the role of representing the Commission as far as functions in third countries were concerned, which were trade and development policies. Now with the new rules introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, these delegations represent the European Union as a whole. They also deal with the Union's foreign policy, since they have acquired those powers that were previously entrusted to the State by holding the six-month Presidency of the Union. The EU Delegation in practice represents the EU in a third country without obviously replacing the diplomatic representations of the member countries and represents the positions of the Union for the full range of its functions. This does not mean that the Delegations of the Union are replacing the diplomatic representation of the Member States. In accordance with art. 32 TEU, the delegations must cooperate with the diplomatic representation on the site. According to Pirozzi, and Comelli\(^{25}\), the European External Action Service must cooperate with the diplomatic services of the Member States. The Lisbon Treaty has brought about a number of changes, particularly in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy. Concerning external action, the European Union operates around the world by promoting its interests, helping the poorest areas in the world through various projects, and thereby contributes to international peace and security. Along with the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 42 TEU was set up by an agency dealing with defense and armaments development, called the European Defence Agency (EDA)\(^{26}\). This agency collects

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\(^{19}\) EEAS.

\(^{20}\) Composed by a French diplomat: Pierre Vimon

\(^{21}\) Formed by an ex-Secretary-General of the European Commission: David O'Sullivan.

\(^{22}\) Composed by a German diplomat: Helga Schmid.

\(^{23}\) Formed by a Polish diplomat: Maciej Popowski.

\(^{24}\) Before the Lisbon Treaty, crisis management was entrusted to the General Secretariat of the Council.

\(^{25}\) Pirozzi, N., Comelli, M., La Politica Estera dell’Unione Europea dopo Lisbona, Osservatorio di politica internazionale, IAI, n.72-febbraio 2013, pp.7-9.

\(^{26}\) EDA.
and processes data related to the field it deals with. The EDA was formally established with the Treaty of Lisbon but was actually established in 2004. Currently, this agency is based in Brussels and all the Member States cooperate with them except for Denmark. The EDA is under the control of the Council of the European Union and the High Representative. Its institutional structure is made up of a decision-making body called the Steering Committee, consisting of representatives of each Member State and a representative of the Commission. The main aims of this agency are: to improve military capabilities\(^{27}\), to foster European cooperation in the field of arms, to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defense sector by creating a more competitive European defense market\(^{28}\) and finally to sponsor activities with the aim of strengthening the industrial technology sector of the European Union countries. The EDA is also entrusted by the Treaty of Lisbon to establish enhanced permanent cooperation, especially in the framework of military cooperation programs. Its operation depends on the level of financial and political support of Member States\(^{29}\). Lastly, speaking of the changes that the Lisbon Treaty has made, it is interesting to analyze the sector of the European Neighborhood Policy\(^{30}\). ENP was launched for the first time in 2003, fully implemented in 2004, and in spite of the existence of the Treaty of Lisbon, this action plan found its legal basis\(^{31}\). The Treaty of Lisbon also established that the ENP and the external action of the European Union are distinct. Prior to Lisbon, this sector was mainly managed by the Commissioner for External Relations. Now the ENP is being programmed by the Commissioner for European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement and the High Representative jointly drafting the ENP Communications and Evaluations. Its institutional organization is managed by the EEAS, which together with the High Representative and the Commission manage the decisions inherent in that policy.

### 1.4 Aftermath of Lisbon and growing need for common foreign defence and security policy

After Lisbon, Europe experienced a financial crisis in 2007-2008 and again in 2011 due to the economic collapse of Greece [Fabbrini, 2015]\(^{32}\). The economic problems that followed after Lisbon were not the only concern the European Union had to deal with. For example, the European Union was faced with the continuing political situation of the Middle East crisis in terms of foreign policy in 2011. After the economic crisis, the challenge of maintaining peace

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\(^{27}\) In October 2006, the AED developed a Long-Term Vision Report, which identified a number of possible scenarios for future EU missions and also designed some military and political capacity-building objectives Europe until 2025.

\(^{28}\) In 2005, Foreign Ministers of States participating in the AED signed a non-binding but voluntary and intergovernmental code of conduct on military equipment purchases, for further details see: Art. 346 TFEU.


\(^{30}\) ENP.

\(^{31}\) See: Article 8, paragraph 1 TEU.

and security in Europe was perhaps the most difficult thing that the EU had faced in post-Lisbon. The uprisings and rebellions in the Middle East and North Africa caused much more violence than before. The case of North Africa in particular represents a perfect example that demonstrates how the new crisis management institutions and instruments were able to carry out the Lisbon Treaty. The EU demonstrated a limited use of the Lisbon Treaty capability and a mixed assessment in terms of the development of the treaty. The crisis in the Middle East and Africa brought to light another problem, that of genocide and war crimes, and the issue of human rights violations. For this reason, a European Union Task Force was launched in 2012 to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the European Union in the implementation of the responsibility of protection. The final assessment was not positive for the EU, in fact, the European Union has to constantly face conflict situations that also involve serious human rights violations, but the EU's approach has been traditional and ineffective. In 2013, the situation in the Middle East and Africa worsened with the appearance of a movement founded in 2004 by Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi to fight the United States: The Nation of the Islamic State. After some conquests, the Islamic State changed its name to ISIS, or Islamic State of Iraq and Syria [Byman, 2015]. ISIS expanded its influence and proclaimed the birth of the "Caliphate" on June 29, 2014. In 2015, the first terrorist attacks launched by ISIS began against five mosques in a Kuwaiti city. In the same year, European terrorist attacks also began, the first country affected being France and then an attack in Tunisia where European tourists were killed in 2016. Currently, ISIS is present in a large part of Libyan territory, in the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt and also in Algeria which has an alliance with Al Qaeda. There are also ISIS cells in Morocco trying to emerge but without success for the moment. In 2016, migratory flows intensified and EU faced a critical situation due to the strong migratory exodus from the Middle East and North Africa in 2016 caused by ISIS. On March 18, 2016, the European Union decided to try to stop this phenomenon by creating a treaty with Turkey to manage immigration flows but there have been few results. Furthermore, the phenomenon of terrorism and repeated terrorist attacks have hit the European countries. France in particular has been hit hard which has led to great dissatisfaction because Europe again demonstrated its weakness [Pirozzi, 2015]. In an effort to deal with the situation the High Representative of the European Union issued a New Global Strategy called Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe [The EU Global Strategy, 2016].

2. PURPOSE OF STUDY

33 R2P or RtoP; is a world policy which was started by all member states of UN after a 2005 World Summit [Bellamy, 2010]. In the UN World Summit countries discussed a necessity to prevent crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide and ethnic cleansing.

This study analyses the Strategies Documents which demonstrate the evolution of what seems to be a common Europe. This research attempts to answer the following questions: What are the characteristics of the EUGS? What changes did the EUGS bring? What direction should the EU take for the future in the formation of a coherent security policy?

3. SOURCES OF EVIDENCE

This section presents a textual analysis of various security documents.

3.1 Strategies documents and why they are important

Before moving on to the comparative analysis of the EU’s strategic policy documents and answering the research questions, it is important to define strategy. Strategy is an action plan conceived and designed to achieve a particular goal. Clausewitz commented on the art of the general in positioning and maneuvering his own military forces in order to break down the enemy. “Grand Strategy”, in contrast to the tactic that employs its resources to defeat the enemy, aims to take hegemony and keep it over time. If a state has the ability to make the most of its logistics and intelligence resources but also its deterrence and alliances, it is considered to have a good strategy [Clausewitz,1832]35. In the past many authors such as Clausewitz [1976], Machiavelli [1988]36, Sun Tzu [2015]37, and others have spoken of war and military strategy. Military strategy has evolved over time. Through military doctrine, the state's survival is ensured and for this reason it exerts much power over the political sphere. Military doctrines are therefore essential for national state policy, above all to preserve its national security.

3.1.1 “Grand Strategy” documents

States employ “Grand Strategy”38 as a military-political instrument used to protect themselves. The “Grand Strategy” or “Strategy of National Security or Global Strategy” gives unity to the general principles used to achieve and secure the security of a country by defining their goals, hierarchy and priorities and the tools to use to achieve such strategic goals. “General strategies” are generated from the "Grand Strategy” which are basically the tools that coordinate with the “Grand Strategy” and help to implement it and can be military, economic and diplomatic, etc. General strategies generate strategic documents or strategic address papers, which describe threats and give the general guidelines of the general strategy and its objectives. In order to be effective, the “Grand Strategy” must identify the threat. Once identified, it must be understood how the state can defeat this threat by studying effective economic and military policies. States

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37 For more information see: Sun Tzu , The Art of War , Project Gutenberg,2015.
38 Also, called High Strategy.
must set priorities and understand what kind of threat they are facing in order to find the right remedy. The general strategy comes from the “Grand Strategy”. When the threat is identified, the state outlines the general points that can help it defeat the enemy of the general strategy [Liddell Hart, 1967]. The “Grand Strategy” follows three essential points:

1. Extending the strategy not only to military but also to diplomatic, financial, economic, information areas, etc.

2. Assessing outside internal forces, as well as external ones, in order to outline internal policies useful to the implementation of the strategy.

3. Keeping pace of peace periods and exploiting them to strengthen themselves so that they are prepared in war time.

Despite strategy being considered a key tool for warfare, it is not always possible to implement it. This is why the critics of the “Grand Strategy” have been criticized by scholars. According to many scholars who are very skeptical about the “Grand Strategy”, building an effective strategy is a dream because in reality it often happens that the strategy does not agree with political goals and for this reason some question its precision [Betts, 2012].

3.1.2 Military doctrine and resources

Another fundamental point when talking about military doctrine is the question of resources. A state needs to invest in its military if it wants to have security. If resources are scarce, the state must try to invest in the most appropriate military that it can afford. In the past, nations could invest in military protection mainly by land or by sea, and sometimes both. Since the end of World War I[40] technological development has also brought about significant innovations in the military field involving more powerful weapons and tools. At the beginning of 1903, Wright[41] invented the first plane. States soon realized the potential that this medium could have. The use of airplanes began during the First World War and brought about a significant improvement in the art of warfare. At the end of the war, this medium was considered to be remarkably innovative and marked a turning point from the military and strategic point of view because it opened up a new front and shortened the time to reach military goals. World War II saw great advances in military innovation. The development of nuclear power was the main military development,


[41] They were two American brothers, inventors.
important both in offensive and defensive war. Perhaps it was most important because of the role it played and continues to play in a tactical scheme [Rosen, 1988]. To try to understand the military and strategic doctrine of countries it is necessary to look at weapons inventory, type of foreign policy utilized, military organization, and where it is trying to maintain control. Military operations can be classified as offensive, defensive or deterrent operations. The first operation is aimed at attacking the enemy and destroying it. The second operation is to defend and attack and eventually destroy the enemy but from a defense perspective. The third type is to punish the aggressor. There is then a fourth military operation called a retarder aimed at hindering enemy troops and gaining time or protecting friendly troops or trying to bring enemy troops to a certain tactical point and then destroying the enemy through a subsequent defensive operation [Posen, 1984]. An issue which impacts military strategic doctrine is that of civilian approval that often disagrees with state military policies, especially if they are aggressive military strategic policies. There are several examples in history where military doctrine required strong social approval. In the United Kingdom, for instance, civilians often opposed the creation of a centralized army, as there was the fear that a strong and overpowering military organization would threaten parliamentary power. A more modern example is the war in Vietnam. American public opinion was divided for a long time among those who supported the doctrine elaborated by Eisenhower, called the domino theory, which argued that if South Vietnam fell under communist, other nations could fall under Communist influence. These were opposed by opponents of this war who perceived the conflict as merely political without sufficiently clarified military objectives. The Vietnam conflict brought forth a new tool that could be used to influence society: mass media. Initially, the US government used information to make the population believe that the Vietnam War was needed to put an end to the threat of communism and that the end would come quickly with little effort. However, with the deterioration of the situation, the lengthening of the conflict, the first images of American war crimes and an even more aggressive policy with the involvement of the neighboring states led the American public to question the credibility of the government. According to Kier [1995], strategic military doctrine is a balance of power between the political, military, and civil sectors, and therefore military and strategic policies are the result of domestic policies. Other writers such as Posen and Snyder [1984;1990] do not agree with the fact that domestic politics have a key role. Instead, they consider international factors as central indicators for the development of military doctrine. Posen [1984], claims that if threats become serious and threatening at the international level, civilians are not ostracized by military doctrine, but rather become strong supporters by acquiring a participatory role; and the army becomes the defender who pursues interests while also

42 From 1955 to 1975.
43 They have done a lot of research into the field of strategic military doctrine and are considered as classical authors of defensive and offensive military doctrines.
adopting offensive strategies that do not reflect the central state strategy. Strategic doctrine and thus strategic documents are important for two reasons: first, these doctrines and documents are elaborated by the states and for this reason affect the international political system because the states make their choices based on the militant strategy they are drafting. The second reason is that if the state does not have a solitary military strategy and doctrine and is not prepared in the event of an attack, it can be damaged or defeated in case of war. The purpose of military doctrine is to ensure the survival of the state. Strategic doctrine is also important during times of peace because it helps to maintain state security. The state must also take advantage of peace times to try to strengthen its strategy and military force without spending too much money; also, maintaining a large army can make other states suspicious and lead to tensions. In the event of crisis, the state will be able to resolve the crisis because it has been prepared in advance [Kier, 1995]. Military doctrine may or may not agree with the goals of the state, but what is essential is that a good strategy must be innovative otherwise it may become stagnant in the long run. The strategy of a state is determined by five factors: politics, geostrategic position, resources, history, and finally military experience. These five points are fundamental and contribute to the building of a solid military strategy that promotes and protects the interests of the state [Snyder, 1990]. In conclusion military strategy and strategic documents are important for two reasons:

1. Both the Strategy and the Strategic Documents are drawn up by the States with their choices based on their goals and thus influence the international political system.

2. A state that does not have a solid military strategy is weak and in the case of an attack without solid guidelines it would lose or in case of war it would be defeated.

3.2 Why these types of documents are important for the European Union

The analysis of strategy, its use by states, the definition of military doctrine and strategic documents leads to the analysis of the European Union and its strategy. The starting point for building a strategic culture for the EU is to set aside nationalism and nationalistic interests. In order to fully understand the importance of a European strategy, why the EU needs a doctrine strategy that sets aside nationalism and also to understand the importance of strategic documents issued by the EU, and because they are now being addressed, one must understand the nature of the European Union and how it works. Thinking of the phenomenon described above, it can be described either in a conceptual approach, (abstract terms) or in a general explanation (theoretical terms). The use of theories and concepts is fundamental to understanding political, economic and social concepts. Hix and Hoyland [2011], provide a comprehensive approach for understanding the nature and features of the EU. In line with them, the theoretical and concentrated work is divided into three parts:
1. The first part seeks to conceptualize the EU's organizational nature.

2. The second tries to give an explanation through a general theorization of the integration process.

3. The third is looking at a conceptual and theoretical approach to understanding the aspects of EU work, above all in terms of policies and processes.

First of all, to conceptualize the EU, we must compare it with the concept of the State and the way it has to behave, we will see that it is far from having the statutory requirements. According to Magnette [2005,3], the EU is an intergovernmental organization, its members are state governments. Magnette's argument has not been very successful. There is a tendency for the EU to be considered among scholars as less than one state but more than an IGO (intergovernmental organization). There is a significant amount of discussion about what type of political system the EU actually is. There are several interpretations that identify it as being a federalist political system. However, some authors such as Warleigh [1998; 2000] think that it should be defined as a confederation. Confederate systems are systems where power is stronger at the regional level. These concepts work together in general terms, because many scholars think that the EU is a unique organization in comparison with the models of traditional political systems. For this reason, many thinkers such as Hix [1998,54] claim that the EU is based on a multilevel governance policy, that is, on a multilevel system. So, the EU has both governmental and supranational characteristics that are the basis of the EU's functioning and define its character [Nugent, 2008]. In addition to conceptual studies on the EU there are also studies based on theories that seek to understand the nature and functioning of the European Union. These theoretical studies are known as the “Grand Theory”, and try to explain the main stages of the integration process. The “Grand Theory” was very successful in the past, but in the 1970s, interest in the “Grand Theory” faded. But in the late 1980s, it came back to the center of the debate. The “Grand Theory” is composed of two founding theories--the theories of neo-functionalism and inter-governmentalism, to which a third is added, that of the theory of interdependence. Neo-functionalism is the dominant theory of EU integration which cam about between 1950 and 1960 [Haas 1958; Lindberg 1963; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998]. Neo-functionalism revolves around the concept of spillover, which can be a functional spillover, according to which European integration has developed mainly in the economic sector. According to this theory, integration into other fields must be given more resources. The second form is the political spillover. It converges in the expectations and interests of national elites as a response to the activities of supranational institutions [Lindberg, 1963]. The second fundamental theory of the “Grand Theory” is inter-governmentalism, which originates in the theory of international relations. This explains the integration process through the political decisions and
actions of the Member States. According to this theory, both external and internal actors of states can influence political processes and developments in a non-dominant way. This decision-making process after the Treaty of Lisbon is being applied by the European Union in the fields of Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs. The model is divided into three components: according to the first component, states' actions are based on the means they consider most appropriate to achieve their goal. The second component through a liberal theory, explains how national interests are influenced by foreign factors due to internal pressures or interactions, conditioned in turn by economic interdependence, that is a bond of dependence with other states. The third component provides an intergovernmental interpretation of interstate relations, where governments have a crucial role [Hoffman 1966; Moravcsik 1991,1993,1995,1998; Grieco,1995; Wincott 1995; Forster 1998,365]. The mentioned theory deals with studying the internal dynamics of the European Union. In order to study the external dynamics of the integration process in the 1970s, the theory of interdependence was introduced, that is, the mutual dependence that is created between states on different levels. This theory extends the context in which the EU operates internationally. According to this theory international relations after World War II have evolved and have led to globalization which in turn has led to different levels of political and economic interdependence. This theory, unlike Neo- functionalism and inter-governmentalism, argues that much of the process of European integration derives from global factors [Keohane,1977; O'Neill,1996]. The process of European integration is very complex and, according to Warleigh [2000], it is divided into three levels. The first level supports the theory of confederation, that is, a multi-state policy, such as the theory that explains the nature and creation of the EU. The second point is multi-level governance, that is, coordinated actions of the Union explaining the functioning and ultimately neo-institutionalism that the institutions are important for determining institutional outcomes, explains the processes of policy formulation and decision-making procedures. It is important to understand the process of integration and how it has influenced the development and functioning of the European security and defense policy of the European Union. It is also important to understand why the process of a strategic culture started late and why it is important to have supporting strategic address papers that express the willingness to cooperate between member states. The Defense and Security sector as well as Foreign Policy have always been a very delicate field for the European Union, which developed late precisely because the states were skeptical about allowing the EU to control such a delicate matter [Howorth,2014]. The European Union, due to the national prospects of France and the United Kingdom, initially did not develop a strategic culture. Only in the 1990s did Europe finally begin to realize that it could no longer act without a defense and security strategy and a solid foreign policy. The Amsterdam Treaty was its first common strategy, thus the first official strategic document of the EU on security. A few years later, in
2001, the European Action Plan on Capabilities\textsuperscript{44} was launched. The ECAP invited the Member States to strengthen European military capabilities through projects. Between 2002 and 2003, around 19 development points were proposed and the solutions to achieve them. The CDM\textsuperscript{45} was introduced 2003 under the Italian Presidency, which was intended to promote the progress of Helsinki. A new official strategic document of the EU called "Secure Europe in a Better World"\textsuperscript{46} was also created in 2003. After Madrid's terrorist attacks in 2004 and an increase in weapons of mass destruction, EU countries understood the need for a common security and defense strategy for the European Union. A military goal was set in 2004 that was to be achieved in 2010, with a civilian goal to be achieved by 2008. The Madrid Report was purposed in 2007, with a codification of a “European way of security”\textsuperscript{47}. Since 2001, the European Union has undertaken several missions under the ESDP, including police missions, such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2003. Also in 2003, the European Union launched a mission to Kinshasa. As the EU's new strategy was launched in that year, the EU was beginning to embrace the goal of ensuring global security and peace. Each mission has been an opportunity to improve for the EU. The European Union demonstrated its ability to operate independently of NATO with the Artemis mission. This mission was approved by the European Council in June 2003 and was led by France. Artemis has demonstrated the capabilities and potential of the European Union [Javier Solana, 2003]. In 2004, the EUJUST THEMIS mission in Georgia was launched for 12 months and was the first European involvement outside the Western Balkans and Africa. The purpose of the mission was to help the Georgian government develop the legal sector. The EU established EU JUST LEX with the aim of training both judicial and police officials. The European post 9/11 strategy and the subsequently confirmed 2003 Strategic Document was to give an integrated response to the threat without the strong use of military forces [Mattelaer, 2010]. After the terrorist attack in Madrid in 2004, the council expressed the will to concentrate on third countries to strengthen and thereby fight against terrorism. The problem with the 2003 strategy is that it has failed despite the missions and new goals. The EU sought to give concrete answers to skeptics who do not believe that the European Union could develop strategy. However, the critics of the European strategic document have been fundamental for the development of the European Union's defense. Due to the Lisbon Treaty and the strengthening of the collaboration between the Council, the Commission and the High Representative have been able to give that political impetus necessary to acquire the military and civil capabilities needed to effectively manage crises. The importance of the EU’s strategic documents is that these documents have been fundamental to the development of the ESDP and are still there. The EU has not been able to respond quickly and effectively to the recent crisis in Mali and Libya. This inability comes from

\textsuperscript{44} ECAP.

\textsuperscript{45} Capability development mechanism.


\textsuperscript{47} http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/CSHS/humanSecurity/madridreport.pdf.
the fact that the European Union invests very little in the field of Security and Defense Policy. For this reason, the formation of a strategic culture is still very far away. The European Union does not feel the need to invest in defense, unlike the US, for example. The EU is far behind the United States in this field. Recently, new white papers have been written in Germany\(^4\) and France\(^4\), pointing out the desire of the European Union to move ahead and face new threats including international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, organized crime and uncontrolled immigration. The current problem of immigration into the EU continues to create tension between the states. Moreover, European states are in favor of the European strategy of combining both military and civilian instruments for peace-keeping [Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, 2001]. In conclusion it can be said that: the awareness of the importance of a common foreign and strategic policy and its development as well as the emergence of European military doctrine and the consequent development of strategic address documents derive from the fact that European States, as stressed in the first part of the 2003 Strategic Document, are facing threats that are likely to undermine European peace such as terrorism or the rise of weapons of mass destruction. The European states understand that the solution to counteract threats is to establish solid cooperation between the Member States in the common foreign security and defense policy. From 2001 to the present day the threats have grown and become more complex thanks to technological innovations that have created more dangerous and powerful tools. The worsening of the crisis situation in the Middle East and North Africa has increased the danger of terrorism that today is one of the major threats and has already affected many victims throughout Europe. Precisely because of this, the European Union felt that it had to revise its strategy and in June 2016 developed a new strategic policy document.

4. MAIN ARGUMENT

After examining the historical and textual evolution of a struggling common European Security Policy, the following observations are made: **the EU needs to improve its foreign defence and security policy.** The EUGS has been successful and has been more than just a goal. Moreover, between 2017 and 2018 the Union to try to achieve the objectives set by the New Global Strategy, with regard to the neighborhood policy, the EU intervened in Libya and Nigeria with action plans to try to resolve the political crisis in which the two countries are involved\(^5\). Also between 2017 and 2018, the European Union in line with the New Global strategy aims to become a global player and to develop an integrated approach to conflicts that will help countries that need the help of the EU to reach the peace, the EU intervened in Colombia and helped the

Colombian government to negotiate peace with the Farc\textsuperscript{51}, which was reached in late 2017 and forecasts for 2018 plans to help in the post-peace phase\textsuperscript{52}. In 2018 EU launched the Card\textsuperscript{53}, an annual report that takes stock of the situation in the defense sector, whose first report will be drawn up at the end of 2018\textsuperscript{54}. Between 2017 and 2018 it can be said that the security and defense policy of the European Union has sought to make progress consistent with the objectives set in the New Global Strategy\textsuperscript{55}. The case of Colombia demonstrates how some goals of the European Union and the New Global Strategy have achieved good results. In other cases, the EU the foreign security and defense policy has fallen short of its goals. However overall there is a sense of optimism, illustrated with this comment, “Two years after its launch, the EU Global Strategy has proven to be the right compass to guide the Union’s action and underpin its ambition to be a credible power and a reliable partner. Despite the challenging international context, the last twelve months have been a period of delivery and progress on many fronts, turning the Global Strategy’s vision into action”\textsuperscript{56} [EUGS, Year2, 2018].

TABLES OF COMPARISON OF THE DOCUMENTS OF EU STRATEGY: from 2003 to 2018

This section shows the gradual evolution of the Strategic Documents from 2003 to 2018. It is important to note that the overall statement of good intentions, without a concrete plan suggested. One can almost note an ongoing dialogue between texts in which needs (threats) are discussed without concrete suggestions. The last section describes and compares the strategic documents of the European Union from 2003 to 2008 and finally illustrates and compares the new strategic address document of 2016 and the implementations.

\textsuperscript{52} https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/countries/colombia_en. retrieved 07/07/2018 at 10 a.m.
\textsuperscript{53} Coordinated annual review on defence (‘CARD’), designed to meet EUGS objectives.
\textsuperscript{54} https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/fr/node/557. retrieved 07/07/2018 at 9 a.m.
\textsuperscript{55} Bronstone A., European Security into the Twenty-First Century; Beyond Traditional Theories of International Relations, Routledge, London, 2018.
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<tr>
<td>2003 Optimistic Introduction</td>
<td>Europe has given way to a period of peace and stability.</td>
<td>Terrorism; Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; Regional Conflicts; State Failure; Organized Crime</td>
<td>Addressing the Threats; Building Security in Our Neighborhood; An International Order Based on Effective Multilateralism</td>
<td>A More Effective and Capable Europe; More Coherent; Working with Partners</td>
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<td>2008 Optimistic Introduction. Its Implementation of 2003 Examines how the strategy has worked in practice, and what should be done to improve security;</td>
<td>Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; Terrorism; Organized Crime; Cyber security; Energy Security; Climate Change</td>
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<td>Pessimistic introduction</td>
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<td>Existence of our Union is being questioned.</td>
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<td>Europeans need a strong Europe.</td>
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<td>Defense Cooperation;</td>
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<td>Resilience;</td>
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### STRATEGIES CONCLUSION:

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<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>“This is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the opportunities. An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.” [ESS, 2003].</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>“This is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the opportunities. An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.” [ESSIR, 2008].</td>
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<td>2016</td>
<td>“This Strategy is underpinned by the vision of, and ambition for, a stronger Union, willing and able to make a positive difference to its citizens and in the world. We must now swiftly translate this into action. First, we will revise existing sectoral strategies, as well as devise and implement new thematic or geographic strategies in line with the political priorities of this Strategy. Such work must begin with clear procedures and timeframes agreed promptly by all relevant players. Second, the EU Global Strategy itself will require periodic reviewing in consultation with the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament. On a yearly basis we will reflect on the state of play of the Strategy, pointing out where further implementation must be sought. Finally, a new process of strategic reflection will be launched whenever the EU and its Member States deem it necessary to enable the Union to navigate effectively our times. Our citizens deserve a true Union, which promotes our shared interests by engaging responsibly and in partnership with others” [EUGS, 2016].</td>
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**EUGS Year-1:**

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<td>EUGS: GLOBAL STRATEGY YEAR 1. Implementation. June 17. Positive introduction. The world was different place than June 2016. The EUGS has been successful and has not remained as some have only thought of a goal.</td>
<td>Resilience of states and societies to our East and South; Integrated Approach to Conflicts and Crises; Security and Defence</td>
<td>Implementing the EUGS goals; Resilience of states and societies to our East and South; Integrated Approach to Conflicts and Crises; Security and Defence</td>
<td>Changing the work way and joined-up Union; Work on the internal-external nexus; Public diplomacy</td>
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<td>STRATEGY</td>
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<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>&quot;It was an intense first year in the implementation of the EU Global Strategy. This work does not and cannot stop here. In the year ahead, the EU will continue to pursue the work strands which have been opened so far, notably but not exclusively in the key field of security and defence. And it will continue to work in a joined-up manner, internally across institutions and Member States, along the internal-external policy nexus, or externally through its work on public diplomacy. The Council and the Commission may also consider exploring other fields for the implementation of the EU Global Strategy, possibly focusing on strategic goals such as the support for cooperative regional orders and global governance, as well as means such as the establishment or empowerment of more responsive and flexible tools in the fields of diplomacy and development, as advocated by the Strategy. The journey translating the EU Global Strategy from a shared vision into common has begun. Let us keep up this momentum in the year ahead of us” [EUGS, 1 Year, 2017].</td>
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**EUGS**  
*Year 2:*

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<td>EUGS:</td>
<td>Resilience of states and societies to our East and South; Integrated Approach to Conflicts and Crises; Security and Defence</td>
<td>Security and Defence Resilience and the Integrated Approach Cooperative Regional Orders Shaping a Multilateral Order for the 21st Century</td>
<td>Strengthening the Link between Internal and External Policies New EU External Budget Proposal: more Resources, Simplification, Flexibility, Transparency and Democratic Scrutiny Promoting Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications</td>
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**2018**

EUGS:  
GLOBAL STRATEGY YEAR 2  
Implementation. June 18.  
Positive introduction.  
The world was different place than June 2016.  
The EUGS has been successful and has not remained as some have only thought of a goal.  
Two years after its launch, the EU Global Strategy has proven to be the right compass to guide the Union’s action and underpin its ambition to be a credible power and a reliable partner.
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<th>STRATEGY CONCLUSION:</th>
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<td>“Two years ago, the EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy anticipated that the years ahead would be a time of “predictable unpredictability.” Indeed, the global system has become more uncertain and less stable since then. Long held beliefs and long-standing international institutions are been questioned. The rules-based international order built after the Second World War has been challenged in a way never seen before. Trade disputes have stoked new tensions, while crucial international mechanisms of cooperation and dialogue have seen their effectiveness and credibility challenged. Respect for human rights and democracy has been declining in many parts of the world. While the territorial defeat of Daesh has almost been achieved, a political solution to the war in Syria is still not in sight. Other protracted conflicts, from Yemen to Gaza, were further exacerbated. The patient work to build win-win solutions is too often mistaken for an exercise in naivety. In this challenging context, the European Union has continued to be a leading force for diplomacy, cooperation and compromise, guided by the EU Global Strategy. We still believe that international rules are not a constraint, but a guarantee for everyone. We still believe that only multilateral diplomacy can lead to solutions that will stand the test of time. Over the past year, we have chosen to invest in a stronger European Union and, at the same time, in a stronger cooperation with our partners. The Union has taken unprecedented steps to increase internal cooperation in the field of security and defence; worked to preserve an international agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme; re-energized the European perspective of the Western Balkans; engaged with partners to strengthen global governance and seek mutually beneficial solutions to common issues, from fighting the impact of climate change to governing migration. Two years after its launch, the EU Global Strategy has proven to be the right compass to guide the Union’s action and underpin its ambition to be a credible power and a reliable partner. Despite the challenging international context, the last twelve months have been a period of delivery and progress on many fronts, turning the Global Strategy’s vision into action”.</td>
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<td>[EUGS,2 Year,2018].</td>
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CONCLUSIONS

The preceding analysis has shown the increasing motivation to establish a common European Security Policy accompanied by a rising fear of global threats. Historical, contextual and linguistic factors all substantiate the growing paradigm shift inside of the EU. Now more than ever there is an ever-growing awareness that single European member states cannot protect themselves alone. A common European Security Policy is urgently needed to guarantee a secure future to all of its citizens. The events of the last years and the ever-present threat of terrorist attacks, both physical and in essential networks that control global finances, weapons systems, etc. as well as the ongoing issues of immigration the European Union has become more and more aware of the glaring need to develop a functional Global Security Policy. It is obvious from the textual analysis that steps are being taken but there is a long road between good intentions and a firm and focused policy. That is the justification for this research which hopefully will assist in opening the debate which will lead to the development and implementation of a serious common Global Security Policy that goes beyond national interests and nationalism. Such a policy must guarantee the wellbeing and development of the entire Union in conflict-free environment of international serenity and peace.

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